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DUE PROCESS AND THE UNTENURED TEACHER:
A REVIEW OF ROTH AND SINDERMANN
Despite the continuing expansion of procedural due process, protec-
tion of public school teachers threatened with termination or nonre-
newal of their employment' has not grown apace. The due process
clause applies only to deprivations of life, liberty or property, and re-
cent decisions of the United States Supreme Court, notably Board of
Regents v. Roth,2 and Perry v. Sindermann,3 restrict the definition of
"liberty" and "property" as they relate to untenured teachers. As a
result, such teachers are left with minimal procedural protections when
threatened with termination or nonrenewal of employment.
In Roth respondent had been employed under a contract "for a fixed
term of one academic year."4 Under Wisconsin law, probationary
teachers (those without tenure) in state universities had "no real pro-
tection . .. . '[N]o reason for non-retention need be given. No review
or appeal is provided in such case.'-5 The president of the university
branch at which respondent taught summarily notified him that his
contract would not be renewed for the succeeding academic year. In
1. There is an obvious distinction between a teacher whose contract of employ-
ment is terminated during its term, and one whose contract is not renewed at the
conclusion of its term. In the former situation, it is clear that the employee has a
"property right" at stake and is entitled to a statement of reasons for the dismissal
and a hearing to challenge the factual basis of those reasons. The nonrenewal
situation is distinguishable from that of mid-term termination, in which proba-
tionary teachers are dismissed during the school year. Compare Nichols v. Eckert,
504 P.2d 1359 (Alas. 1973), with Van Gorder v. Mantanuska-Susitna Borough
School Dist., 513 P.2d 1094 (Alas. 1973), and Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972). See also Pratt, Nichols v. Eckert: Due Process Rights of Non-Tenured
Teachers to Pre-Termination Hearings, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALAsx L. RFv. 180 (1974).
2. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
4. 408 U.S. at 566. Under Wisconsin law, then current, no teacher in a state
university attained tenure until completion of "4 years of continuous service in the
state university system as a teacher." Law of Dec. 20, 1965, ch. 497, § 1 1965]
Wis. Laws 779. The probationary period is now anywhere from zero to seven
years. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.13(2) (b) (Supp. 1975).
5. 408 U.S. at 567 (quoting university rules promulgated by the Board of Re-
gents).
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seeking to have his dismissal enjoined, he alleged that the denial of a
statement of reasons and a hearing violated due process and that the
dismissal was in fact based on his criticism of the university adminis-
tration, violating his first amendment rights. The district court granted
respondent's motion for summary judgment on the due process issue,
and the court of appeals affirmed.7 The Supreme Court admitted that
the lower court had properly interpreted the balancing test used in
Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy:8 "a weighing process has
long been a part of any determination of the form of hearing required
in particular situations by procedural due process. But, to determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake.""
The due process clause applies only where the plaintiff can show a
deprivation of life, liberty or property. The Court found that since
6. Roth v. Board of Regents, 310 F. Supp. 972, 983 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
7. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
8. 367 U.S. 886 (1961), aff'g 284 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In Restaurant
Workers a cook who had been employed for six years in a privateiy-operated cafe-
teria at a naval gun factory was directed to surrender her security badge, thus termi-
nating her employment, since without security clearance no one could enter the gun
factory. Id. at 888. The cook's request for a hearing was denied. In an action to re-
cover her security status, the Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment
for the defendant. The Court distinguished the then recent case of Greene v. Mc-
Elroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (employee's dismissal invalidated because the govern-
ment had not adopted appropriate regulations), because in Restaurant Workers a
regulation granting the commander of a naval installation broad powers over trades-
men was in effect. 367 U.S. at 892. To determine the cook's entitlement to due proc-
ess protection, the Court in Restaurant Workers applied a balancing test, considering
"the precise nature of the government function involved as well as... the private in-
terest that has been affected by governmental action." Id. at 895. The balance tipped
toward the government: its proprietary interest in "the internal operation of an im-
portant federal military establishment" outweighed the private interest of the cook in
pursuing her trade "at one isolated and specific military installation." Id. at 896. Cf.
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947). The district court in Roth applied the test of
Restaurant Workers, comparing the university's interest in "be[ing] free arbitrarily
to decide not to retain a professor," with the teacher's interest in not being
dismissed "on a basis wholly without reason." 310 F. Supp. at 978-79. It reached
a different conclusion than did the Supreme Court in Restaurant Workers,
finding the teacher's interest in this particular position stronger than the cook's
interest in the particular position in question in Restaurant Workers. Id. at 977-78.
9. 408 U.S. at 570-71.
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the first amendment issue was not before it,1° respondent had not been
deprived of liberty.1" Respondent's property interest in his position
was also held insufficient to activate the protection of the clause. The
term of his contract was only one year and he had no statutory right to
reemployment.2 The Court accordingly reversed the decision of the
court of appeals.
On the same day, the Court decided Perry v. Sindermann."s Re-
spondent had taught in the Texas state college system for ten years,
and at the Odessa Junior College for four years, under a series of one-
year contracts. 4 During part of this period he served as president of
the Texas Junior College Teachers Association, in which capacity he
publicly advocated a proposal to upgrade Odessa to four-year status-
a proposal opposed by the Board of Regents. When respondent's con-
tract ran out, the Board of Regents voted not to renew it. Al-
though the Board issued a press release setting forth allegations of
respondent's insubordination, it refused to provide him a further state-
ment of reasons for his nonrenewal or a hearing to challenge it.15
Respondent, suing in federal court, alleged an entitlement to a
hearing on the legitimacy of his dismissal and that the dismissal was
based, impermissibly, on his public statements opposing positions
espoused by the Board of Regents. The district court granted the
Board's motion for summary judgment- and the court of appeals
10. The district court stayed further proceedings on the question of whether
the teacher's dismissal was based on constitutionally protected speech because it
granted the relief sought on the procedural due process issue. 310 F. Supp. at 983.
11. See notes 50-57 and accompanying text infra.
12. 408 U.S. at 576-78. The Court stated that there was no "state statute or
University rule or policy that secured [the employee's] interest in re-employment."
Id. at 578 (emphasis added). The district court found as uncontroverted fact,
however, that "[o]f 442 non-tenured teachers at the university, four were given
notice that contracts would not be offered them for 1969-1970." 310 F. Supp. at
974 (emphasis added). The rehiring of more than 99% of all untenured teachers
would appear to be, at minimum, a "policy" of reemployment; accordingly, the
Court's statement is questionable. See also 5 CoNN. L. REv. 685, 692-94, 697-98
(1973) ; note 27 infra.
13. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
14. Id. at 594.
15. Id. at 594-95.
16. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1970). The opinion of
the district court was not reported.
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reversed.'7 The Supreme Court held that respondent was entitled to
prove his first amendment claim in the district courtI8 and that the
allegations of his petition, if proved, would establish a valid claim
based on a denial of due process.' 9
The Supreme Court dealt with two separate issues in Sindermann.
As viewed by the Court, respondent's first amendment claim presented
a genuine factual dispute. The Court followed numerous previous
decisions in holding that the expression of opinion on controversial
issues is an improper basis for dismissal.20 Accordingly, the Court held
that granting summary judgment against the respondent's first amend-
ment claim was improper.21.
The Court's treatment of respondent's due process claim in Sinder-
mann distinguishes that case from Roth.22 As in Roth, the Court
maintained that the simple refusal to rehire a nontenured teacher did
not amount to a deprivation of property.23 But the Court amplified
the Roth opinion in Sindermann by stating that the absence of a
contractual right of renewal was not controlling. The employee in
Sindermann had "alleged that the college had a de facto tenure pro-
gram."24 The existence of such a program, and respondent's par-
ticipation in it, would constitute a sufficient interest in property to
17. Id. The reversal was based on the "expectancy test" employed by the Fifth
Circuit. See note 67 infra.
18. 408 U.S. at 598.
19. Id. at 602-03.
20. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
21. 408 U.S. at 598. Compare Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir.
1972), with Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973), and Tygrett v. Washington, 346 F. Supp. 1247
(D.D.C. 1972).
22. The cases can also be distinguished on the basis of the first amendment
claims. In Roth those claims were not before the Court; in Sindermann they were.
This distinction, however, is merely procedural. Compare Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972), with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599
(1972).
23. 408 U.S. at 599.
24. Id. at 600. The Court quoted the college's official Faculty Guide: "Teacher
Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College
wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his
teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude
toward his co-workers and his superiors .... ." Id.
[Vol. 10:283
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entitle him to a hearing before dismissal.2 The Supreme Court felt the
Fifth Circuit went too far in deciding that a "mere subjective 'ex-
pectancy' is protected by procedural due process." 26 But the Court
was convinced on the basis of an existing "de facto tenure" system that
the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to demonstrate
that he had a property interest in continued employment.27
The rules that emerge from these cases are easily stated. First, it is
clear that a public employee is not entitled to procedural protection
from termination of employment unless he has at stake an interest
protected by the due process clause,2 8 i.e. the dismissal must deny the
employee "liberty" or "property." Secondly, it appears that even when
the employee's "liberty" or "property" is threatened, the degree of
25. The Court defined such a property interest as "a person's interest in a bene-
fit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or mu-
tually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit
and that he may invoke at a hearing." Id. at 601. The limits of a public em-
ployee's property interest in his employment are not created by the Constitution,
but rather are a function of the "rules or understandings" issued by an independent
source, such as the state government. Id. at 577. See, e.g., National Educ. Ass'n
v. Lee County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 467 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1972); Wilson
v. Pleasant Hill School Dist., 465 F.2d 1366 (8th Cir. 1972). See generally
Seitz, Due Process for Public School Teachers in Nonrenewal and Discharge Situa-
tions, 25 HASTINGs L. Rav. 881, 887 (1974).
26. 408 U.S. at 603.
27. The different results in Roth and Sindermann are explained, in part, by the
presence in the latter case of a "binding understanding fostered by the college ad-
ministration" that professors would be rehired. Id. at 599-600. "[R]espondent
alleged that the college had a de facto tenure program, and that he had tenure
under that program." Id. at 600. But when one considers the fact that in Roth
the university had rehired all but four of 442 untenured teachers, the conduct of
the parties in Roth becomes more difficult to distinguish from the conduct of the
parties in Sindermann: the Roth facts, if taken in the light most favorable to the
respondent, begin to resemble a de facto tenure system.
The Court discusses this aspect of the case and dismisses it in a perfunctorily
brief footnote. 408 U.S. at 578 n.16. It may well be that the Court was aware
of the potential conflict in the decisions and deliberately made little of this aspect
of Roth. If so, the approach seems to have been successful, since some commen-
tators have overlooked this aspect of Roth. See Griffis & Wilson, Constitutional
Rights and Remedies in the Non-Renewal of a Public School Teacher's Employ-
ment Contract, 25 BAYLoR L. Rav. 549, 560-67 (1973). Yet this cluster of facts
seems to undercut the Court's own "property right" distinction of the cases. The
net result is that the right to a statement of reasons and a hearing depends on
whether or not "understandings" are "binding," and this is a difficult question to
resolve.
28. 408 U.S. at 571.
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protection provided by the due process clause will be determined by
balancing the governmental with the private interests-"
The fact that these rules may be stated readily does not, however,
mitigate the difficulty of applying them to a given set of facts. The
Supreme Court believed Roth and Sindermann to be distinguishable
on their facts;30 it did not plot the location of a boundary beyond
which due process requires a hearing.3' Nor does the Sindermann
29. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). It is
far from clear, however, that the Restaurant Workers test is still relevant. The
Court distinguished Restaurant Workers in reaching its conclusion in Roth. 408
U.S. at 573-74. In reaching a contrary conclusion in Sindermann, the Court did
not cite Restaurant Workers. Arguably the Court's decisions in Roth and Sinder-
mann liberalize the Restaurant Workers rule, particularly in light of the Court's
comment in Roth that "[tjhe constitutional requirement of opportunity for some
form of hearing before deprivation of a protected interest, of course, does not
depend upon ... a narrow balancing process." Id. at 570-71 n.8. This statement
may or may not be dictum, but since the Court rejected the Restaurant Workers
rationale, the phrase at least indicates which way the Court is leaning on the
matter.
30. But see note 12 supra. For an excellent attempt to distinguish the fact sit-
uations in Roth from Sindermann see Griffis & Wilson, supra note 27, at 561, 565;
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rzv. 335, 365-66
(1974).
Nevertheless, many factual situations fall somewhere in between, and whether a
particular case is more like Roth or Sindermann is not always clear. See, e.g.,
Canady v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973) (hearing granted where dismissal
based on incompetency); Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972) (hear-
ing granted for nonrenewal of one-year contract after 29 years of service, even
though state had no tenure system whatsoever). Compare McNeill v. Butz, 480
F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973) (no hearing granted where dismissal based on alleged
criminal conduct), and Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972) (hearing
denied where dismissal based on use of the classroom to teach sexual education),
with Moore v. Knowles, 482 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1973) (hearing granted where
nonrenewal predicated on criminal indictment), and Stolberg v. Members of Bd.
of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (hearing granted where dismissal based
on classroom criticism of Indochina War).
31. The net result of the Court's failure to clarify the proper grounds for entitle-
ment to a hearing is the perpetuation of the conflict which existed prior to Roth
and Sindermann. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir.
1970) (statement of charges, names of those making charges, and opportunity to
be heard before impartial tribunal with educational expertise are required before
nonrenewal of contract of untenured teacher with expectancy of reemployment).
Compare Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), reu'd, 408
U.S. 564 (1972) (statement of reasons and minimal hearing required before
dismissal of untenured teacher), Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d
1182, 1185, 1188 (1st Cir. 1970) (dismissal of untenured teacher requires statement
,of reasons, but not hearing), and Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 944 (5th
[Vol. 10:283
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opinion outline the procedures required when due process mandates a
hearing upon termination of an employee's position. Sindermann
holds only that a dismissed employee whose interest in his position
meets the vague "property right" test may attempt to prove his free
speech and due process claims. 2 This is far from a guarantee of a
hearing before dismissal.33
The broadening of procedural protection for litigants has been the
general trend and has been accomplished, in part, by the Supreme
Court's expanded recognition of protected "property" interests.3 4 A
hearing is required before garnishment of wages, 35 termination of wel-
fare benefits,- revocation of parole 37 or driver's license,3s or reposses-
sion of goods.35
Cir. 1970), aft'd, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (untenured teacher with expectancy of
renewal of contract must be granted statement of reasons and hearings), with
Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128, 135 (6th Cir. 1971) (statement of reasons and
hearing not required for nonrenewal of contract of untenured teacher); Thaw
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 432 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1970) (no hearing
required on nonrenewal of untenured teacher's contract if teacher fails to allege
that dismissal was for constitutionally impermissible reasons), and Bradford v.
School Dist., 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966) (no hearing required despite teacher's
contention that dismissal was based on race, when district's alleged reason for dis-
missal was teacher's conviction for public drunkenness and assaulting a police
officer). See also Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96
(1963) (notice of reasons and hearing required for applicant denied admission to
state bar); 85 HArrv. L. Rav. 1327 (1972) (commenting on the rule of the First
Circuit).
32. 408 U.S. at 598, 603.
33. Establishing the right to a hearing may represent a Pyrrhic victory for the
employee. First, the hearing itself is likely to occur long after the employee's dis-
missal. See note 64 infra. Secondly, the substantive law may provide for termina-
tion at will. See, e.g., Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d
153 (8th Cir. 1973) (teacher dismissed after falsely being accused of racism en-
titled to a hearing and retroactive pay, since dismissal is considered a nullity, but
not to reinstatement). For a detailed analysis of available remedies for improper
teacher dismissals see Grifs & Wilson, supra note 27, at 569-93.
34. The concept of protected "property" interests has been expanded "beyond
actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money" as a "safeguard of the security
of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." 408 U.S. at
572, 576. The most noteworthy expansion of due process, however, has been in
criminal cases where "life" or "liberty" is at stake. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145 (1968); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See notes 50-57 and accompanying text infra.
35. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
36. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
37. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
38. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
39. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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Roth and Sindermann indicate that the breadth of protected in-
terests for untenured teachers, and perhaps for public employees gen-
erally, lags somewhat behind this general trend.40 For example, in
Goldberg v. Kelley,42 the Supreme Court applied a balancing test to
determine the procedural protection due welfare recipients threatened
with termination of benefits. The Court held that efforts to prevent
arbitrary termination of welfare benefits by providing a full hearing
after termination were insufficient; only a pre-termination hearing
would suffice.42 The Court recognized welfare benefits as property,"
40. Traditionally, public employment has been considered a privilege rather than
a right. A classic statement of this distinction appears in McAuliffe v. Mayor &
Bd. of Aldermen, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). Responding to the asser-
tion that a policeman had a right to his position, justice Holmes stated that "[t~he
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. Viewing public
employment as a privilege, the courts were hesitant to admit that a government
employee who was dismissed from his position had been deprived of life, liberty or
property (interests enumerated in the fourteenth amendment which can trigger due
process protection). See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), aff'g
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). There has, however, been an erosion of the right-
privilege distinction in recent years. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HArrv. L. Rv. 1439 (1968).
Several theories have been developed enabling courts to view the employee's inter-
est in public employment under one of the protected categories. Teachers, as well
as other public employees, may be entitled to statutory procedural protection. See,
e.g., Kraus, The Effect of the Stull Bill on Teacher Dismissals, 9 LINCOLN L. RV.
90 (1974); 1 Lab. Rel. Rep. 35 (1971). But such statutory provisions have been
strictly construed against the employee. Thus, in Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist.,
509 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1974), the court denied an employee the right to
a pre-termination hearing.
[I]t is clear that those same statutory provisions, which outline the proce-
dures for terminating a teacher's employment, do not provide for full-dress
procedural due process. Where, as here, the only "grant of a substantive
right [to continued employment] is inextricably intertwined with the limita-
tions on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right,
a litigant [challenging the termination of employment] must take the bitter
with the sweet." Because Ms. Buhr's only "property interest" in re-employ-
ment "was itself conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accom-
panied the grant of that interest," there is no merit to her claimed right to
full procedural due process.
Id. at 1200 (footnotes omitted).
41. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
42. Id. at 266.
43. "It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'prop-
erty' than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the
form of rights that do not fall within the traditional common-law concepts of
property." Id. at 262 n.8.
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and a fair analogy may be made between a public employee's entitle-
ment to his position and a welfare recipient's entitlement to benefits.
The public employee is as dependent on employment income for sur-
vival as the welfare recipient is on benefits. Moreover, the public
employee's position is more analogous to a traditional contract rela-
tionship 4 4-and thus to a familiar form of "property rights"-than is
the position of the welfare beneficiary, because an agreed-upon ex-
change exists between the public employee and the government which
is absent in the welfare recipient's relationship with the government.
Yet the present law grants all welfare recipients due process protection
when threatened with termination of benefits; many public employees
do not enjoy the same right.
The Court also applied the "property" concept more strictly in Roth
and Sindermann than in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.45 and
Fuentes v. Shevin.46 In Sniadach the Court treated wages as "a spe-
cialized type of property" 47 not subject to seizure without notice and a
prior hearing.48 In Fuentes the Supreme Court refused to allow repos-
session of chattels purchased under conditional sales contracts without
In Roth the Court attempted to distinguish Goldberg on the basis that in Gold-
berg the entitlement to benefits was secured by a statute. 408 U.S. at 577. The
distinction, however, is dubious. The statute involved in Goldberg was the federal
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) legislation, codified as 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). The procedures with
which Goldberg dealt were designed to determine whether particular beneficiaries
met the qualifications. The statute was thus more analogous to one creating a
public position and setting its minimum qualifications than to a statute granting
"tenure" to a public employee.
44. Cf. Note, Implied Contract Rights to job Security, supra note 30, at 335.
45. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
46. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). It appeared that the Fuentes rule had been crippled
by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974). Many commentators saw no practical differences between the two
cases, and read Mitchell as reversing Fuentes sub silentio. See Note, Provisional
Remedies and Due Process in Default-Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 1974 WASH.
U.L.Q. 653. But cf. 10 URBAN L. ANN. 243 (1975). The Court apparently
believed them distinguishable, however, and declined to follow Mitchell, electing
to follow Fuentes instead in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601 (1975). The situation of the Fuentes rule may be analogous to that of
the rule of Roth and Sindermann. It appears that the Court may engage in a
process of resolving the seizure and garnishment cases by placing them either in
the Fuentes or the Mitchell pigeonhole.
47. 395 U.S. at 340.
48. The Court considered the evil of the Wisconsin wage garnishment pro-
cedure to be the deprivation of the use of income without notice and a hearing
1975]
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a prior hearing: "If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full
purpose ... it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still
be prevented.... [N]o later hearing and no damage award can undo
the fact that the arbitrary taking... has already occurred." 49
A determination that a public employee has no property right in his
position that entitles him to a pre-termination hearing absent a statute,
administrative regulation, agreement or policy to the contrary, resolves
only part of the due process problem, since the due process clause pro-
tects "liberty" as well as "property."50 The Roth court spoke of "lib-
erty" as the right "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."5 1
Under the Court's analysis, a violation of an untenured teacher's lib-
erty occurs when his dismissal or nonrenewal will "seriously damage
his standing and associations in the community,"5 2 or "impose... a
stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] his freedom to take advan-
tage of other employment opportunities."5 " While accepting the lower
before the deprivation: "[A] prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may
as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall. Where the taking
of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that
absent notice and a prior hearing ... this ... procedure violates the fundamental
principles of due process." Id. at 341-42.
49. 407 U.S. at 81-82. The property in question was a gas stove purchased on
a conditional sales contract.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
51. 408 U.S. at 572, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
52. 408 U.S. at 573.
53. Id. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and opportunity to be
heard are essential." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); Wellner v. Minnesota State
Junior College Bd., 487 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973); Berry v. Hamblin, 356 F. Supp.
306 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Perkins v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 353 F. Supp. 618
(C.D. Cal. 1973); cf. Black Students v. Williams, 470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding that students are entitled to prior hearing to prevent stigmatization from
school board actions prior to suspension from public school); Williams v. Dade
County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). But cf.
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961); note
8 supra. Even the most damaging statements do not trigger due process protection
if relegated to confidential files, Buhr v. Buffalo Pub. School Dist., 509 F.2d
1196 (8th Cir. 1974), or disclosed to the employee in a private session, Kaprelian
v. Texas Women's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975) (filing allegations does
not itself establish the basis for public stigma).
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court's view that nonretention alone creates a serious impediment to a
teacher's career, 4 the Court asserted: "It stretches the concept too far
to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not
rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another. ''55
Critics have challenged the validity of this assertion-5 In any event,
decisions since Roth and Sindermann have failed to clarify just how
great the stigma from nonrenewal must be to constitute a deprivation
of liberty.57
Infringement upon constitutionally protected rights, other than
"life," "liberty" or "property," are also subject to due process restraints.
Thus the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a public employee
may not be denied employment for the exercise of first amendment
rights, including freedom of expression, 58 freedom of association, 59 and
54. 446 F.2d at 809.
55. 408 U.S. at 575. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 157 (1974).
56. Justice Douglas, dissenting, strongly disagreed with the majority view:
"Nonrenewal of a teacher's contract is tantamount to a dismissal and the conse-
quences may be enormous. Nonrenewal can be a blemish that turns into a perma-
nent scar and effectively limits any chance the teacher has of being rehired as a
teacher, at least in his State." 408 U.S. at 585. Others have recognized the
practical effects of nonrenewal. See, e.g., Kallen, The Roth Decision: Does the
Nontenured Teacher Have a Constitutional Right to a Hearing Before Non-
renewal?, 61 ILL. B.J. 464 (1973) ; Shulman, Employment of Nontenured Faculty:
Some Implications of Roth and Sindermann, 51 D.NvER LJ. 215 (1974); Van
Alstyne, The Supreme Court Speaks to the Untenured: A Comment on Board of
Regents v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann, 58 A.A.U.P. BULL. 267 (1972).
57. See, e.g., Lipp v. Board of Educ., 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972); Johnson v.
Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972); Russo v. Central School Dist., 469
F.2d 623, 630 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Wilderman
v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1972); McDowell v. Texas, 465 F.2d 1342
(5th Cir. 1971) ; Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Bd., No. 4-71 Civil
555 (D. Minn., Dec. 18, 1972); Franz v. Board of Educ., No. 772 Civil 151 (N.D.
Ill., Aug. 10, 1972); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist., 337 F. Supp. 977
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
58. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (teacher's
criticism of school board not grounds for dismissal). Further, the Court has held
that requiring an employee to take a loyalty oath has a "chilling effect" on his
first amendment rights and is therefore impermissible. Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). See also
Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965). But see Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). The imminent threat
of dismissal may deter the exercise of first amendment rights as severely as a
required loyalty oath, particularly if, as in Roth, the dismissing authority is not
required even to state the reason for dismissal. See 408 U.S. at 578-79. Cf. Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 598.
59. See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); ElIfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett
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free exercise of religion. 0 Nor can a state terminate public employ-
ment on grounds that amount to a denial of equal protection.6l While
it is clear that governmental discretion to terminate employment may
not be exercised in violation of fundamental substantive rights, Roth
and Sindermann fail to delineate the deprivation that must occur be-
fore a public employee is entitled to a hearing.6 2 The Supreme Court
held only that if there is a "genuine dispute" as to whether the em-
ployee's dismissal violated fundamental substantive rights, then is he
entitled to a hearing.63 The Court did not determine the type or time
of such hearing.C4
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Cf. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.
278 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). All the foregoing cases
struck down loyalty oaths for public employees. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960) (teacher may not be required to submit annually a list of all
organizations to which he belonged during the year).
60. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (applicant may not be denied
office of notary public for refusal to declare belief in God).
61. Trister v. University of Miss., 420 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v.
Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967). It
has never been necessary for the Supreme Court to hold that a public employee
may not be dismissed on a racial basis, but the Court has often cited United
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947): "Congress may not 'enact a
regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to
federal office' ... ." Id. at 100.
62. In Roth, respondent's free speech claim was not before the Court, since the
district court had granted summary judgment on the due process issue, 408 U.S.
at 569, and stayed proceedings on the first amendment claim, id. at 574-75. In
Sindermann the Court held only that respondent's free speech claim could with-
stand summary judgment. 408 U.S. at 598. The two opinions do not resolve the
question of whether mere allegation by the employee that his dismissal was based
on his exercise of first amendment rights entities him to a hearing. Cf. Kaprelian
v. Texas Women's Univ., 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1975).
63. 408 U.S. at 598. The Court did not give any guidelines as to when a
"genuine dispute" might be found to exist.
64. The Court did not emphasize the importance of a hearing before termina-
tion. As a practical matter, even if the employee receives adequate notice of
termination, the hearing will follow termination, since the employee must first prove
his entitlement to a hearing. Cases following Roth and Sindermann illustrate that
even when an employee is held to be entitled to a hearing, the hearing is likely to
occur long after the employee's dismissal. See Weilner v. Minnesota State Junior
College Bd., 487 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's employment terminated on
or about June 1, 1971, and hearing granted by effect of appeals decision of Oct.
23, 1973); Canady v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's dis-
missal effective Nov. 12, 1970, and hearing granted by effect of court of
appeals decision of June 11, 1973); Shumate v. Board of Educ., 478 F.2d 233
(4th Cir. 1973) (plaintiff's dismissal effective on or about June 1, 1972, and
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The Roth-Sindermann rule is inadequate in terms of procedural due
process. The rule narrowly confines the "property" and "liberty" pro-
tected by the fourteenth amendment;6 5 it fails to protect substantive
rights granted by the first and fourteenth amendments and does not
clarify the law because of the failure to delineate a workable test to
determine the boundaries of protected "property" interests.
A "better" rule was available to the Court when it decided Sinder-
mann and Roth. The Fifth Circuit had ruled that an employee was
entitled to a hearing before termination or nonrenewal if he had "an
expectancy" of continued or renewed employment.6s In Sindermann,
however, the Court took the opportunity to dismiss the "expectancy"
hearing granted by effect of court of appeals decision of Mar. 4, 1973); Stolberg
v. Members of Bd. of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (plaintiff dismissed
Feb. 27, 1969, and hearing granted by effect of court of appeals decision of
Jan. 29, 1973); Johnson v. Fraley, 470 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff
dismissed Apr. 13, 1970, and hearing granted by effect of court of appeals decision
of Nov. 20, 1972). The mean length of time between dismissal and the appellate
court decision granting a hearing in these cases was approximately two years,
five months. During this period the employee has lost his job and, arguably,
a valuable property right.
65. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Roth, took a broad view of protected inter-
ests and was willing to recognize the employee's status in the public sector itself
as deserving of some due process protection.
In my view, every citizen who applies for a government job is entitled to it
unless the government can establish some reason for denying employment.
This is the "property" right that I believe is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and that cannot be denied "without due process of law." And
it is also liberty-liberty to work-which is the "very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity" secured by the Fourteenth Amendment.
408 U.S. at 588-89.
66. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1970), affd, 408 U.S.
593 (1972); notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra. See Ferguson v. Thomas,
430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970); Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415 F.2d
851 (5th Cir. 1969). Other circuits had adopted similar positions. See generally
Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Johnson v.
Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Bomar
v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947). In Bomar Judge Learned Hand declared:
"[W]e assume that . .. [plaintiff's] discharge by the Board was not a breach of
contract at all. Nevertheless, it may have been the termination of an expectancy
of continued employment, and that is an injury to an interest which the law will
protect." Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
A comprehensive definition of "expectancy" for these or any other purposes
may be difficult to provide. For the purposes for which the term is used, a fair
definition of an "expectancy" of continued or renewed employment would be "a
reasonable belief" that employment will be renewed or continued. This definition
appears to be consistent with those cases employing the expectancy test and suffi-
ciently definite to produce consistent results in varying fact situations.
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test.63 This test is more desirable than the Roth-Sindermann rule be-
cause it more clearly identifies the minimum property interests to be
protected by due process.6 8 At the same time, by including some in-
terests not considered "property" under the Roth-Sindermann rule,
the expectancy test gives more adequate protection to the substantive
rights of public employees. Consequently, in terms of both the clarity
and the substance of the test, the expectancy doctrine is preferable to
the Roth-Sindermann approach for determining the applicability of
due process to public employee dismissals and nonrenewals.
Paul E. Ground
67. "We disagree with the Court of Appeals insofar as it held that a mere sub-
jective 'expectancy' is protected by procedural due process." 408 U.S. at 603.
68. At least one writer disagrees, finding the Roth-Sindermann test praiseworthy.
61 Ky. L.J. 830, 844 (1973). Reading Roth and Sindermann together with earlier
cases, he asserts that the question of whether a property interest qualifies for due
process protection is determined by whether or not it has "vested." Id. at 842-44.
If this were the case, the rule of Roth and Sindermann would be more supportable,
since its application would be clearer. Unfortunately, as the writer admits, "The
full theoretical ramifications of the entitlement, or 'vested right,' idea in the area
of governmental largess is as yet highly conjectural." Id. at 842.
The lack of clarity in the Roth-Sindermann rule may result in part from the
incremental decisionmaling style of the present Supreme Court. Professor Van
Alstyne discusses this problem in an outstanding article written prior to the deci-
sions in Roth and Sindermann. His comments on incrementalism are prophetic.
See Van Alstyne, Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuxE
L.J. 841.
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